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THE TIME OF TRUTH 
REFLECTIONS ON ALAIN BADIOU'S READING 
OF SAINT PAUL 
MARC DE KESEL 
Up until the late eighties, Soviet Communism was a significant point of refer-
ence for leftist political thought in the West. Although heavily criticized, it at 
least lent formal support to the idea that our capitalist neo-liberal system had 
an alternative, an 'outside', an 'other'. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, 
Western ideology critique had to make do without that support. A radically 
alternative society seemed to be impossible. Besides, post-modernity was now 
telling us that the "grand narratives" were over and that we were, fmally, beyond 
ideology. Since then, all "grand ideas" - even the very idea of truth itself -
have been on the verge of being abandoned. Have not all catastrophes of recent 
history been caused by absolute truth-claims? Was it not for this reason that 
revolutions have t1Jnted so easily into totalitarianism, or, as we should now say, 
into fundamentalism? These days, absolute truth - truth as such - can no longer 
form the horizon for any critique of ideology. 
Such, at least, is the generally accepted idea today. But this is not an idea that 
Alain Badiou is convinced by. According to this contemporary French philoso-
pher, these well-known post-modern conditions most definitely do not make 
up the horizon of our current critique. On the contrary. Today, more than ever, 
our post-modern era needs truths- truths that (despite that strange pluraP) 
claim- and must claim- universality. Moreover, the genuine locus for truth-
claims is revolt and, therefore, the age of Revolution is far from being over. 
Not reformation, but revolt will give our time the truth it needs. It needs leftist 
revolts, Badiou adds, for these are the only true ones. Formed in the Althus-
serian school, his political position has always been 'far left' .2 He was - and 
1 Badiou discerns four "generic procedures", four domains independent from each other, each 
supporting the possibility for a proper Truth procedure: science, politics, art and love. Cf. for instance 
(Badiou, 1988: 23). See also (Lecercle, 1999: 9). 
2 Cf. the first part of Bruno Bosteels's excellent essay about 'Badiou's Theory of the Subject' 
(Bosteels, 2001). 
208 The Time of Truth 
still is - a convinced Maoist. And his entire oeuvre is to be read as an attempt 
to give this leftist position a solid new philosophical ground. 
It is stunning therefore to see how positively he writes about Saint Paul, one 
of the founding fathers of Christianity. For isn't Christianity precisely the con-
servative ideology that for almost two millennia legitimized the existing politi-
cal and cultural power? Was it not for this precise reason one of the primary 
targets of our lengthy critical tradition? How can we, then, explain Badiou's 
appreciation for someone who is responsible for this type of ideology? Why 
did he write an entire book on Saint Paul (Badiou, 1997a)? 
It is certainly not because of Saint Paul's well-known evocations of human 
finitude and sinfulness in which one easily recognizes the modem analysis of 
our 'condition humaine'. This is what we fmd, for instance, in Jacques Lacan, 
another of Badiou' s 'masters'. 3 Badiou' s approach to Saint Paul is completely 
different. He appreciates Paul solely for his doctrinal side, i.e. his belief in 
Christ's resurrection, and, more precisely, his belief that this is a 'catholic' 
truth, a truth for everyone in the whole world (being the meaning of the Greek 
word 'K.a9'6/..,oc,','kat'holos')4• What Badiou affirms inJ>aul is above all his 
'formal Catholicism'. 
In this essay, I will first give a rough sketch of the theoretical context in 
which Badiou's reading of Paul is to be situated (cf. 1- 3). I will explain 
how, with his reference to Paul's belief in Christ's resurrection, Badiou illus-
trates his own theory of the 'event', i.e. the main topic of his magnum opus, 
L'etre et l'evenement (Being and the event, Badiou, 1988), as well as that of 
his entire oeuvre. This will bring me, in a second moment, to an analysis of 
the fundamental presupposition secretly sustaining Badiou's entire theoretical 
framework (4). Thirdly and fmally I will counter Badiou's interpretation of 
Paul with a reading of chapter eleven of Paul's Letter to the Romans (5-6). 
I will show how the universality claimed there by Paul's text contains an 
important element Badiou neglects. This will provide the basis for my critique 
of Badiou's notion of universal truth. 
3 Think, for example, of a famous passage in his seventh chapter of his Letter to the Romans: 
"For we know that the law is spiritual- but I am unspiritual, sold into slavery to sin. For I don't 
understand what I am doing. For I do not do what I want - instead, I do what I hate. But if I do what 
I don't want, I agree that the law is good. But now it is no longer me doing it, but sin that lives in 
me. For I know that nothing good lives in me, that is, in my flesh. For I want to do the good, but I 
cannot do it. For I do not do the good I want, but I do the very evil I do not want! Now if I do what 
I do not want, it is no longer me doing it but sin that lives in me." (Letter to the Romans 7: 14-20). 
For Lacan's comment of this passage, cf. (Lacan, 1986: 100-102) and (Lacan, 1992: 82-84). 
4 Ka-ra, kata: stands for 'concerning'; and oA.oc;, holos means 'the whole', 'the universe'. 
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1. Event 
"Why Saint Paul?" asks Badiou in the opening lines of the first chapter of his 
book. Why should he, Badiou, a convinced atheist philosopher, refer to one of 
the founders of Christianity? His answer is clear: Paul fits into the "develop-
ment" of his theory. He is a perfect illustration of what his philosophy is about. 
In a few lines on the first page of Saint Paul, which give a good impression of 
his clear and often apodictic style, Badiou briefly summarizes the meaning of 
his entire philosophical project. "Why Saint Paul? [ ... ] How to inscribe this 
name in the development of our attempt: to give a new foundation to a theory 
of the Subject, which subordinates its existence to the aleatoric dimension of 
the event as well as to the pure contingency of the 'being multiple' without 
sacrificing the theme of truth?" (Badiou, 1997a: 5; my translation) 
Rebuilding a theory of the subject, founding the subject in the 'event', connect-
ing it with the 'multiplicity' of being, and linking it up with a new theory of 
truth: these four points perfectly encapsulate Badiou's philosophical project. 
Let us briefly develop the logic linking these four topics together. 
The immediate background of his attempt to formulate a new theory of the 
subject lies in his disagreement with Louis Althusser's structuralist critique of 
the subject. This taught us that the human subject is not so much the master of 
its ideas or its 'ideology', as the effect of those ideas or ideology. The subject 
is already the result of an 'ideological interpellation', Althusser claims.5 Even 
man's most intimate subjectivity is a creation of ideology. Running counter 
to Althusser' s structuralist elimination of it, Badiou stresses the philosophi-
cal and political value of the subject which he judges indispensable for an 
effective critique of ideology. Despite the subject's undeniable spontaneous 
inclination towards ideological interpellation, a free subject is nevertheless 
possible. While ideology's grip may be unavoidable, it is, at least to a certain 
extent, capable of acting independently of it. According to Badiou, after the 
revolution of 1917, the Russian proletariat became the subject of a fidelity to 
a new truth. This subject-, the Communist Party- was not only the effect of 
a new ideology. It was, first and foremost, a free subject that, by its fidelity, 
gave support to the truth-event of the revolution. 
As we will see, Badiou' s theory - including his theory of the subject - is 
largely mathematical. Therefore, it is useful to consider the problem of the 
subject in its broader historical and philosophical context. The 'subject' is a 
5 Cf. his article, 'Ideologie et appareils ideologiques d'Etat' in (Althusser, 1976). 
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term - and a problem - we inherit from a long philosophical tradition. The 
term itself is derived from the Medieval Latin word 'subjectum', which for 
its part is the translation of the Aristotelian Greek word 'hypokeimenon'. In 
Aristotle, it is a purely logical term and stands for the 'bearer' or 'support' 
of an attribute. In the proposition 'the table is red', for instance, 'table' is the 
hypokeimenon (subjectum) of the attribute 'red'. In the early middle ages, the 
term took on greater weight and became an ontological concept, becoming the 
'bearer' or 'support' of reality, of being as such. In contrast to ancient philoso-
phy, where the 'subject' was Being itself, medieval Christian thought situated 
Being's ultimate subject (its fmal ground) in God. For (Aristotelian) Thorn-
ism, God was creation's 'frrst cause' and, in that sense, was its 'subjectum'. 
While speaking 'logically' of things, one was all the same supposed to know 
them 'ontologically': one presumed to have knowledge of their essence- of 
their fmite bearer, 'substance', 'subject' -and thus to have knowledge of the 
ultimate 'subject', i.e. of God, the infmite subject of all those fmite subjects. 
Modernity is defmed as a break with that presupposition. Modem science no 
longer presumes to have knowledge of reality's essenc~. This is why moder-
nity is, in the frrst place, a break with Aristotle, i.e. with an 'essentialist phys-
ics'. In the field of religion, it was already with the Reformation - under the 
influence of anti-Thomist Occamism- that this pretension was discarded.6 In 
the eyes of the Reformers, God was so profoundly elevated above man that 
it became impossible for man to have any positive knowledge of God. In the 
scientific realm, the 'mathematization of our world picture' enhanced this ten-
dency. 7 Galileo and Newton constructed a science based on both observation 
and mathematics: they mathematically described the 'outside' of the things 
they observed, and were no longer methodologically interested in their 'inside' 
(i.e. their essence). 
6 In this respect, one must remember that Luther's great enemy was not primarily the Pope (it was only 
later he gradually became virulent antipapal), but Aristotle. A few months before he nailed his 95 theses 
(on the "power and efficacy of indulgences") on the Wittenberg church door (October 31, 1517), Luther 
had written another series of theses (as was a typical in those days, a proposal for public 'disputatio '), that 
made his anti-Aristotelianism was very clear. By way of illustration, I quote several of these theses: "41: 
Almost the entire Ethics of Aristotle is bad and against grace. 43: It is wrong to say: without Aristotle, 
one cannot become a theologian. 44: On the contrary, one becomes only theologian without Aristotle. 
50: In short, the whole work of Aristotle relates to theology as darkness to light." A few weeks before 
(May 18), in a letter to a friend about the intellectual climate at his university, Luther wrote: "Aristotle is 
declining and his definite downfall is near." (Boendermaker, 1982: 57, 60; my translation). 
7 Cf. (Dijksterhuis, 1969). According to Dijksterhuis, the "mechanization', typically modem way 
of looking at the world, goes hand in hand with the fact that mathematics has become increasingly 
dominant in our science. 
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Mathematics is of great importance to Badiou as well. He not only frequently 
refers to it; the very form of his reasoning is often purely and directly math-
ematical. Mathematics is literally the grammar through which a large part of 
his work is written. One of Badiou's fundamental claims is that 'mathemat-
ics is ontology' and 'ontology is mathematics'.8 With this claim, he wishes 
to strengthen the characteristically modem 'mathematization' I just referred 
to. Mathematics, for Badiou, is our most radical remedy against the nostalgia 
for transcendence that haunts modem thought. Indeed, since modem thought 
acknowledges its own finitude, the infinite can easily be understood as what 
lies beyond the boundaries of human knowledge. According to Badiou, this is 
modernity's "romanticism," giving new life to a medieval transcendentalism that 
is completely incompatible with modernity's own radically immanent thought.9 
What is radically modem in mathematics is its claim of an infinity that does not 
lie beyond the limits of its finitude. It considers infinity as simply one of the 
elements that it can play with. The infinite is just one of the 'numbers' that 
mathematics reckons with. While our knowledge is of course finite (we cannot 
know the real qua real), infinity lies not outside that knowledge but inside it. 
Mathematics is thus a superlative instrument for remaining faithful to moder-
nity's radical immanence (or, which for Badiou amounts to the same thing, to 
its materialism). For it considers being qua being as purely immanent and con-
tingent multiplicity, including being's infinite dimension. To put it in terms of 
Badiou' s chief source of reference, set theory, it considers being as an infinite 
set of sets. Mathematical set theory enables one to acknowledge the "the pure 
contingency of the «being multiple»", referred to by Badiou in the opening 
lines we quoted from Saint Paul. 
With this thesis, Badiou critiques the fascination with alterity that is the hall-
mark of many philosophies today. Thinkers such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Levi-
nas, Derrida, de Certeau among others argue that the way we usually think of 
Being excludes a radical kind of 'Otherness'. This is why, to their minds, our 
classical way of thinking can easily degenerate into totalitarianism: it ensnares 
8 Cf., for instance: (Badiou, 1988: 20ft). Cf. also Peter Hallward's interview, 'Politics and Phi-
losophy: An Interview with Alain Badiou' in (Badiou, 2001: 130ft). 
9 In an interview in Artforum, Badiou claims: "The real romantic heritage - which is still with 
us today - is the theme of finitude. The idea that an apprehension of the human condition occurs 
primordially in the understanding of its finitude maintains infinity at a distance that's both evanes-
cent and sacred and holds it in the vicinity of a vision of being that's still theological. That's why I 
think the only really contemporary requirement for philosophy since Nietzsche is the secularization 
of infinity. [ ... ] Mathematics secularizes inlmity in the clearest way, by formalizing it." (Badiou, 
1994: 86). For a more elaborated version of this issue, cf. his essay 'Philosophie et mathematique' 
in (Badiou, 1992: 157-178). 
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all otherness within the circle of a single dominant standard; it subsumes all 
difference under the grasp of a monolithic 'Sameness'. It is because we want 
to make the other- the fool, the woman, the black, the Jew, the gypsy, the 
immigrant, the 'sans papier' - equal to the Same that we persecute him or 
her, This sameness should thus be opened up to its radical Other, and Being 
itself opened towards what is "other than being" (to quote the title of one of 
Levinas's major works: "Autremement qu'etre"; Levinas, 1974; 1981). 
According to Badiou, it is not sameness but otherness that characterizes Being. The 
difference that modem philosophy should reflect upon is thus not the one between 
Being and its other, but the difference- and, more precisely, the differences-
within Being itself. This is why Being is to be considered as multiplicity, as a 
set of different sets, as an 'infinite set of sets'. But how does Badiou articulate the 
"contingency" of the "being multiple"? Or, to use a word that he prefers to avoid: 
how does he think its 'finitude'? For this is what he tries to do: to think the finitude 
of ontology without referring to the distinction between infinity and finitude. 
It is here we must introduce the notion of the event, another of the four basic 
elements of Badiou's philosophy as given in the passage cited above. With 
this notion, Badiou will be able to think contingency and finitude in a radically 
immanent way. For with this, ontology, which articulates Being's infinity in an 
abstract way, does not have a total grip of the real ground of 'all that is'. This 
'real' does not lie simply in Being in its settled form (or, in Badiou's terms, as 
it is 'represented'), nor is it 'other than being'. Being's 'real' ground is its tem-
porality, its contingency, i.e. the mere fact that it happens, occurs, takes place. 
Ontology is there to formulate being's contours, not by formulating what differs 
from it, but by formulating its 'historiality'. Being, i.e. the infinite set of sets, is 
not a substance resting upon its eternal ground; it is resting upon a contingent 
ground, upon the mere fact it is 'occurring', 'happening'. Being 'as such' is not 
to equal the totality of sets representing being, it is not the totality or representa-
tions; it is what is present without being represented, without being part of the 
totality of representations. Being as such - being qua being - can only be felt 
in what is merely present (without being represented), in what only 'occurs', 
'happens', 'takes place'. This is what Badiou calls an evenement (event). 
In a sense, then, Badiou's thesis is not unlike one of Heidegger's main con-
cerns. He, too, focused on temporality or 'historiality' ('Geschichtlichkeit'), 
of being qua being. No wonder that he is an important reference for Badiou, 
in spite of their different politics.10 Badiou's thesis is also close to one of the 
10 In this respect it is significant that the first reference in L 'etre et I' evenement is, precisely, 
Heidegger (cf. Badiou, 1988: 7). 
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main topics pursued by Gilles Deleuze, the other great thinker of the event. 11 
Both, Heidegger and Deleuze - albeit in profoundly different ways - approach 
being from a reflection on time - Heidegger proceeding from Aristotle, Dun 
Scotus and (a critique of) Husser!; Deleuze proceeding from ancient stoic 
philosophy, Bergson, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Nietzsche. Badiou fully admits 
the influence of both12, but nonetheless approaches the problem of 'being and 
time' in a different way. His way of thinking 'being and time' proceeds from 
mathematics. 
He approaches being mathematically, i.e. as an 'infinite set of sets'. This 
implies that every single being belongs to a particular set- or, to put it in 
another of his terms, it 'represents' a particular set. That is why being is "rep-
resentation": every single being 'is' something in so far it is represented as 
a particular set of beings. However, being qua Being is not to be considered 
as a set amongst the others, nor is it a set transcending all other sets. In the 
'infinite set of sets', being qua Being is not 'represented' at all. It is not a part 
of the totality of particular representations. Can we say, then, that it is not? 
No, for it certainly is, but is not a set, nor a particular representation. It is only 
a "presentation"; it is present merely as a 'set' that, paradoxically, must be 
described as empty13 ; or, which amounts to the same thing, it is present only 
in single elements, single insofar as they do not (or no longer) belong to one 
of the existing particular sets and, in that sense, float unsubstantially about 
being qua Being's 'e-mpty set'. 
Imagine, for example, several elements from different sets that come to leave 
off representing their particular sets. 14 Imagine that they begin to function 
on their own. In such a case, something happens. An 'event' takes place, 
and disturbs the existing order, the collected sets representing being's totality. 
At that moment, the order comes to realize that it does not rest upon its 
11 Badiou wrote a monograph on Deleuze (Badiou, 1997b ). 
12 In his book on Deleuze, Badiou claims: "je soutiens pour rna part que Deleuze est sur nombre 
de points cruciaux (Ia difference, l'ouvert, le temps ... ) moins eloigne de Heidegger qu'on l'imagine 
communement, et sans doute qu'il ne le pense lui-mente" (Badiou, 1997b: 34). «For my own part, 
I recall that on a number of crucial points (difference, the opening, time) Deleuze is less far from 
Heidegger than one commonly imagines, and that he doubtless thinks so himself.». 
13 See for example, the 'Fifth Meditation' of L'etre et /'evenement, (Badiou, 1988: 73-83). For Badi-
ou's theory of the empty set as a criticism of Deleuze concept of 'the virtual', see Badiou, 1997b: 70-72. 
14 In this sense, Badiou will define truth as a "diagonal" set: "La verite est diagonale au regard 
de tousles sous-ensembles communautaires, elle ne s'autorise d'aucune identite et (ce point est evi-
demment le plus delicat) elle n'en constitue aucune." (Badiou 1997a: 15). "Truth is diagonal with 
regard to all the communal under-sets; it neither gives any identity nor (and this point is clearly the 
most delicate) does is constitute any." 
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'representations', upon the distinctions and particularities constituting its sup-
posed identity. In the fmal analysis, it is only based on radical contingency, on 
being qua Being, o presentation' that cannot be locked up in the infinite 
totality of 'representations', i.e. of sets representing being. At that moment, 
revolution is in the air. It is the moment when nothing is safe or secure, and 
everything is on the verge of changing. In such moments, truth can emerge. 
That truth is the effect of a fidelity to the event, a truth fighting for a new 
world proceeding from those floating single elements that undermine the exist-
ing order. 
Eighteenth-century France, for instance, can be considered a 'set of sets' .15 
The social and political order consisted in a balanced relationship between 
four general sets, i.e. the three estates- nobility, clergy, the third estate (the 
bourgeois)- and the ones without 'standing' (the majority of the population). 
In this sense, everyone represented a particular set and the entire 'set of sets' 
was more or less in balance. In balance at least until certain elements from dif-
ferent sets left their traditional way of thinking behind and discovered that each 
were, in the first place, not so much part of their set (p~ of their estate, for 
instance), as singular, and that, precisely in this quality, universally equal to 
everyone else. They discovered themselves simply as human beings, and real-
ized, from this perspective, that all humans are equal. The distinctions invoked 
until that moment that enabled them to perform their particular identity - as 
nobleman, clergyman, bourgeois or whatever - became unimportant. From 
now on, the truth of human beings was they were universally equal. However, 
there was no representation for that truth. There was no such thing as a 'uni-
versal set of equal humans'. This set was, so to speak, still empty, having not 
yet found its 'representation'. So, universal equality could only claim existence 
by referring to the empty set being qua Being. And that empty set could only 
be experienced as an event, as an unforeseen 'happening' that makes all 'set-
tled sets' lose their ground and gives pure contingency its full chance. 
However, this contingency must be the place- the 'site'- where a new truth 
can emerge. The empty and abstract 'universal set' must be transformed into a 
real one; its 'presentation' must become a 'representation'. It has therefore to 
be made so, in the active sense of the word. That is what happens in the act of 
revolution. Only a revolution can unchain the power still sleeping in an event. 
It gives the event its name, its subject, and enables that subject to become 
faithful to the event. This is how the 'French Revolution' 'worked', and, as 
15 For a more elaborated 'mathematical' analysis of the French Revolution, see Badiou, 1988: 
20lff. 
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Badiou says, was able to set up its 'truth-procedure'. By the very force of its 
name and its slogans ("egalite, fraternite, liberte", "la liberte ou la mort", et 
cetera), the empty set began to change into a more concrete, full set. And it 
generated militants supporting the revolutionary cause unconditionally, i.e. the 
empty set of 'universal equality' they were fighting for. Only by promoting 
the revolution's truth could the empty set really become the set- the norm, 
the standard - of Being itself. 
The revolutionary experience of the event implies the discovery of a truth that 
belongs to none of the existing sets, but has, nevertheless, something to say 
concerning elements from each one of those sets. This truth can only be 'one', 
and at the same time must count for everyone. 16 But this universal truth is 
never simply given. It is not a 'truth of facts'. This truth demands a changing 
of the facts. It is a truth we must fight for, a truth that is impossible without 
unconditional faith or a revolutionary act. 
It is only now that we can clarify what Badiou means by 'subject'. It is the 
bearer of a fidelity to an event, the bearer of a faith in the truth founded on the 
event. It is the subject of a belief, not in what already exists - not a belief in 
one of the existing 'sets'-, but in a truth based upon an unseen event, having 
the power to disturb the totality of particular sets. The subject is the bearer of 
a belief in an empty set, which, unlike the existing sets, claims universality. It 
is a subject, in other words, of a set still to come or to be realised. Thus, the 
proper locus of the subject lies in the future, too. Paradoxically, it does not 
precede its own fidelity to an event; it does not precede the truth of which it 
is the subject. It comes into existence only through fidelity and truth. It is an 
effect both of the event and of the fidelity to that event. Only through fidelity 
does truth come into being (in what Badiou calls a 'truth-procedure'). Truth 
is, by definition, 'post-evental'. In the same paradoxical way, Badiou asserts 
that the subject of fidelity is fidelity's own effect, its own product. 
2. Paul's Event: ... 
If Badiou is interested in Saint Paul, it is because he recognizes in Paul's 
doctrine some of the central concerns of his own theory. His theory of truth, 
16 According to Badiou, the post-modem idea that there are no longer truths and that there is a 
fortiori no longer a single Universal Truth is an ideological idea in the negative sense of the word. 
This kind of relativism secretly claims a single grand empty Truth: the truth that everything is related 
to the great unifier of capitalism's money. Against this empty universal claim, Badiou wishes to rein-
stall the possibility of truly universal claims that acknowledge their own contingency (or "relativity") 
in a correct, non-dissembling way. See, among many other passages, Badiou, 1997a: 7. 
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for instance, can easily be linked to one of the central dogmas of Paul's theol-
ogy: his belief in a single truth as the truth for everyone in the whole universe, 
'whether he is Jew or Greek, man or woman', as we read in many of his letters. 
This is literally the most 'catholic' side of Saint Paul. For while Paul is perhaps 
not the founder of Christianity (since this is presumed to be Christ himself), 
he is certainly the founder of the Christianity's 'catholicity', i.e. of its claim to 
have a true message 'kat'holon', for the whole universe: Christ's resurrection 
brought Glad Tidings, not only for the Jews, but for the 'Gentiles' - for all 
the other 'nations'- as well. 
However, Badiou's reference to Paul's 'Catholicism' concerns only the formal 
structure of his truth-claim. He explicitly rejects the content of Paul's- or 
Christianity's- doctrine. Its universality-claim, however, is what makes Paul 
our "contemporary" (as the title of the ftrst chapter suggests). Like Paul, we 
must also acknowledge that no one can claim a truth in his quality of a par-
ticular person, community, territory, culture, or whatever. Truth cannot be 
claimed by a settled part of society, but only by a marginal, singular element 
that is incapable of speaking in the name of any part, an<\ is, therefore, obliged 
to invoke universality.Thus Badiou writes in his ftrst chapter: 
Paul's outrageous gesture consists in withdrawing truth from the communitar-
ian grip, be it the grip of a people, a city, an empire, a territory or a social 
class. What is true (or what is just, which in this case amounts to the same 
thing) cannot be reduced to an objective set, neither as its cause nor as its 
destiny. (Badiou, 1997a: 6) 
Truth is not only for Jews like Jesus and himself, Paul claims. With regard to 
truth, "there is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is 
neither male nor female- for all of you are one in Christ Jesus" (Galatians 3: 
28). Truth is not the concern of a particular part of a totality, "for there is no 
partiality with God" (Romans 2: 12)Y 
But on what grounds does Paul claim this truth, according to Badiou? Not 
on the grounds that Paul himself asserts. Not because the Creator of the uni-
verse revealed this to him. This is what Christian doctrine teaches, which in 
Badiou' s eyes is just a "fable", a "name", for what on the most fundamental 
level must be described as an event (Badiou, 1997: 5). An event, however, is 
accessible only through an absolutely singular experience. Although it gener-
ates a universal truth, the experience of the event can be shared with no one. 
It is an experience beyond communication. So how can an event be described? 
17 Both passages are cited in Badiou, 1997a: 10. 
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It can only be reconstructed afterwards, indirectly and retroactively, in terms 
that link it up to a truth. If describing the event is already extremely difficult 
for the one who experienced it, it is even worse for another, for Badiou for 
instance, describing Paul's event. Nevertheless, relying on some details from 
Paul's biography as well as on some of his own theoretical tools (for instance 
his 'set theoretical' approach), Badiou reconstructs and interprets what hap-
pened to Paul on the way to Damascus. For this is the precise moment of 
Paul's event. 
What happened to Paul in that moment, according to Badiou? Not unlike 
Oedipus, he became blind the very moment he saw the truth. It was the truth 
a dissident Jewish group believed in. At that moment, Paul, a Jewish Pharisee 
from Tarsus operating in Jerusalem and Palestine, vigorously prosecuted that 
group of dissenters. They believed that Jesus, who died on the cross, had risen 
from the dead, and that he was therefore the Messiah, the Christ. We do not 
know if this was what bothered Paul the most in this dissident doctrine, but 
this was, after his experience on the way to Damascus, the truth he became 
convinced of. 
In fact was it the only thing he retained from the dissenters' doctrine. In his 
eyes, Christianity's sole truth is Christ's resurrection. Other issues concerning 
Jesus remain almost unmentioned in his letters. All the great things the gospels 
talk about - his preaching, his parables, his controversies with Pharisees and 
Sadducees, the acts he performed, and the wonders he witnessed - seem of 
little importance to Paul. The only thing that counts for him is that Christ was 
resurrected, or, which amounts to the same, that Jesus is the Christ. 
3 .... Christ's resurrection 
Christ's resurrection: this is the 'name' Paul chose for the event he experi-
enced. It was his word for what disturbed and suspended all the 'words' and 
'names' constituting the world at that time. With that name, Badiou explains, 
Paul opened this world towards its own contingency, its own 'occurring', its 
act of 'taking place', 'of happening'. This does not mean that the chosen word 
was a term unknown to Paul until then. This term belonged to the 'set of sets' 
constituting the then world. But it did not yet name a separate set. It referred 
to elements from existing sets, without forming a set of its own. It was, if you 
like, the name of a 'non-existing' or empty set- a set that could only come 
into being through the 'intervention' of believers. 18 
18 For the notion of intervention, see for instance Badiou, 1988: 223-233 and Badiou, 1997a: 33. 
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Or, to put it in another one of Badiou's metaphorical schemes: the word Paul 
uses to express his experience of the event belonged to the 'situation' in which 
Judaism was settled at that time. 'Resurrection', 'Christ' and 'Messiah' were 
terms functioning in the culture of the day, but they did not really support 
the 'situation'. They operate on the contours, in the margins of it, i.e. in what 
Badiou calls a 'site': a place on the borderline of a 'situation', in the quasi 
non-existing area of the 'empty set' where the situation faces its own contin-
gency. 19 Paul's event, and the name he chose for it, threw Judaism's 'situation' 
back upon its 'evental' ground, upon the 'place' where it 'took place'. There, 
in that 'site', a new truth - resurrection - could emerge. 
The possibility of resurrection and the idea that someone could be the Messiah 
accorded with the 'situation' of the Judaism of those days. It is a part of the 
messianic movement of that time, a movement that was grafted onto the ker-
nel of Judaism, i.e. its Torah. Elected among all nations by the universal God 
for a special relation with him, the Jewish people received the Thora, a sign 
of that election. This was the Law that God had given to his people as their 
proper way to happiness. Although this Law was perfect in itself, the people 
never managed to fulfill it, so the Jewish 'fable' related. Several times during 
their history, God had warned- or even punished- them by the well-known 
vicissitudes they were forced to endure: the division of David's Kingdom 
(9th century BC), the Exile and destruction of the Northern Kingdom (722 BC}, 
the Exile of the Southern Kingdom (i.e. the Babylonian Captivity, 586-540 
BC) et cetera. But since it was all in vain, the idea came into being that God 
Himself, through a messenger (a new King, a Messiah), would intervene to 
fulfill the Law and deliver Israel from the debt run up by their failure to fulfill 
the Law's commandments. This is why, in Paul's time, several individuals 
were pretenders to being the Messiah (or, in Greek, the Christ), i.e. the crea-
tor of a new 'Davidian Kingdom'. 'Christ' was thus an idea that fitted into 
the culture- the 'situation'- of that time. And so was 'resurrection', being a 
major topic of dispute between Pharisees who believed in it, and Sadducees 
who did not. But, on the other hand, Christ's resurrection was a term that did 
not fit in that 'situation'. Or, it did only so in a "diagonal" way (Badiou 1997: 
29, 46).1t assembled elements, collected 'diagonally' from different parts and 
discourses constituting the Jewish world of that time. Moreover, it drew on 
elements from the other world Paul lived in, the world of the 'Greek', i.e. the 
Hellenistic culture of the Roman Empire. 
19 For the concepts of 'situation' and 'site' (comparable to some extent with 'representation' and 
'presentation', or, 'set of sets' and 'empty sets'), see Badiou, 1988: 114ff, 121-128, 193-198. 
Marc De Kesel 219 
'Christ's resurrection' was thus a term representing a 'collage' that, as such, 
did not yet exist at that time. It had no proper place in the 'situation' yet, nor 
outside it. It had its place only in the contours of it, i.e. in its 'site'. Com-
prised of several elements from different parts of the situation, but, as such, 
having no proper existence or place in it, it existed only by the grace of being 
qua Being. It could only fmd its support in the most abstract support there 
is, in the support every singular element is resting upon, independent of the 
part it is settled in: pure Being. This is what Paul experienced on his way to 
Damascus. For years, he had been engaged in the diverse - Jewish as well as 
Greek - discourses and discussions of his time. But now those engagements 
and reflections had brought him into the very margin of that world. He faced 
the point- the 'site'- where those particular discourses lost their ground and 
confronted the pure contingency of their being. 
Paul's experience is thus a fall into the 'gap' -the 'void', the 'empty set' -the 
world is resting upon. However, according to Badiou, this 'gap' or 'void' is not 
the Nothing from which God created the world. Rather than a reference to some-
thing transcendental, it is radically immanent; it is Being itself in its contingent 
act of being. It is Being experienced as an event that explodes the differences 
and distinctions constituting the world up till then. This is why Paul's experi-
ence is an experience of being qua Being, and, therefore, annihilates the differ-
ence between the two worlds he was living in, the Jewish and the Greek one. 
Here for Badiou, two ~ompletely different worlds collapse, each representing a 
different type of discourse presupposing opposite paradigms. Jewish discourse 
approaches reality as a set of signs referring to what is 'beyond'. In that sense, 
it is the "discourse of the sign" (Badiou, 1997: 44). Things are true, only inso-
far as they refer to transcendence. Truth itself is not natural but exceptional, 
and can only be known by reading signs that reveal their transcendent origin. 
This is what a prophet does par excellence. The Greek discourse, on the other 
hand, presupposes reality not as referring to a transcendent outside, but as 
being entirely self-referential. It rests upon 'nature', 'phusis' ('cpucn~'). So, the 
Greek discourse focuses not on exceptions but only on what is constitutive for 
being's totality. Truth is a matter of gaining insight into that totality, and this is 
the task of a philosopher or a wise man par excellence. For Greek discourse, a 
(Jewish) prophet can only be a fool. And, similarly, for the Jewish discourse, 
(Greek) thought and wisdom are foolish. 
Both discourses deny their real 'ground', since they deny the event they rest 
upon. The 'Christian discourse' does not make this mistake, since it fully 
acknowledges the event of Christ's resurrection, and, through Christ's resur-
rection, the event of Being itself. Precisely because of its belief in an event, 
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Christian discourse can no longer be Greek or Jewish. That Christ had risen 
from the dead means that, now, the particular difference between Greek and 
Jew has lost its importance. Being Jew or being Greek has become indifferent 
with respect to the kind of 'being' the experience of the event has revealed. 
From now on, Greeks and Jews deal in the same open possibility that being 
qua Being is. This is the truth that Paul saw. This is the "truth procedure" he 
put into action. Both Greek and Jew - i.e. everyone in the whole universe -
share in the fact that the 'gap' being is founded on, is not a sign of death' s 
dominion, but of the radical possibility named life. 
It is this that Badiou understands by resurrection. The experience of the real 
ground our world is built upon - the experience of the impossible real, to use 
a Lacanian term Badiou often refers to - is the experience not of finitude and 
death but of infinity and life. The experience of what lies beyond our capacity 
to experience is an experience of universal possibility, not of impossibility. 
This is what happened in the event of Christ's resurrection. This is what Paul 
experienced falling from his horse on his way to Damascus. 
4. In Being We Trust 
Badiou's concept of the 'event' is not unlike a crucial paradox found in many 
other philosophers and critics in the twentieth century: an experience revealing 
the very limits of our capacity to experience. It is the experience of a radi-
cal finitude that marks us. Unlike traditional philosophy, many modem and 
post-modem thinkers refuse to consider this finitude as a negative proof of 
transcendence and infinite truth. They claim we must deal with our finitude in 
an entirely immanent way. Most therefore conclude that we ought to reconcile 
ourselves to it and renounce our aspirations to infinity as much as we can. 
Despite our infinite technical power, we must remain aware of our incapacity 
to go beyond the limits of our finitude. This, for example, is how Heidegger 
interprets that experience and, on that basis, declares human truth to be radi-
cally finite. Or, as post-modem thinkers would say: since we are able to invent 
any kind of truth we want, we had better stop speaking in the name of a single 
and eternal truth or, perhaps, in the name of truth at all. 
Yet, the same paradoxical experience brings Badiou to a radically opposite 
conclusion. The 'experience incompatible with our capacity to experience' is 
precisely what gives us our capacity for infinity. It invites us to create truths 
that transcend the 'opinions' we are settled in; it restores our possibility of 
infinitude, not in the metaphysical sense of being eternal souls, but in the sense 
of destroying the finite limits in which we become established. It gives us the 
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generosity of being: not the generosity of a divine Creator, as monotheistic 
religion believes, but the generosity of immanent being itself, of being as an 
inexhaustible source of possibilities. This is what Christ's resurrection did, 
according to Paul: it "changed the relation between possibility and impos-
sibility". (Badiou, 1997a: 47) Suddenly, what had until then seemed impos-
sible became possible, what had seemed to be death's impasse became a true, 
universal way of living. 
The sole criterion for a change or revolution to be true is its universality. 
Therefore, the privileged distinctions constituting the existing society (the 
'estates', the classes, the groups) are to be destroyed, and power must become 
accessible to everyone. This is why, in contrast with the Russian Revolution 
of 1917, the fascist revolution in Germany 1933 was not a true revolution for 
Badiou. It maintained the privileges of one part of the world (the "Aryans"), 
while the promises of the Russian Revolution were explicitly intended to be 
universal. Fascist revolution, Badiou explains in L 'Ethique, was not built upon 
a real event, but only upon a supposed one, a "simulacrum". It did not bring 
the "void" of the previous society into existence, the contingent ontological 
void upon which society rests. Rather, fascist revolution privileged merely 
one of the existing society's parts (Badiou, 1993: 64-65: 2001: 72-73). Only 
what is inexistent in the previous society, what is lacking in it, can connect 
a revolution with the empty set that being qua Being is. And only such an 
ontologically-based revolution is a true revolution. 
Here, we touch upon a hidden assumption secretly sustaining Badiou' s philo-
sophical system. Surely, things like 'event', 'revolution' and 'truth' must be 
situated on the level of concrete and 'material' reality; they concern the content 
side of it. However, Badiou approaches reality in a strictly formal way. This is 
why mathematics is so central to his thought. For Badiou, only a totally abstract 
system is capable of articulating a new theory of truths. Of course, the eternal 
Truth of which the metaphysical tradition dreamed is a chimera. But truths exist. 
Although radically contingent, they nevertheless function as truth and at times 
really change the world. From this perspective, Badiou's purely formal approach 
is able to think the truth of Paul's Christianity, neglecting its entire content. 
While he does not believe a word of what it teaches, he nevertheless explains 
why it once was true, and why the truths of our days are true for the very same 
formal reasons. Indeed, because of truth's contingency, we cannot take a meta-
position and tell the Truth about the different (so-called) truths. At least, we can-
not do this with respect to content. But nonetheless we have a formal criterion 
for truths: they must be universal. So was Paul's truth in the frrst century AD, so 
was Lenin's truth in 1917, and so should our truth be at the beginning of the 21st 
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century. Why, precisely, should universality be the formal criterion? Because 
universality characterizes Being at its most fundamental level. Being in its 
purely ontological dimension (being qua being) belongs to no one or nothing in 
particular, but nonetheless characterizes everyone and everything. 
Thus far, Badiou's approach appears to be strictly formal. At this level, being 
qua Being is an empty set. Nevertheless, it hides an important assumption at 
the level of content, an assumption upon which his entire approach appears to 
rely. He presumes that being at its most fundamental level- being qua Being, 
as experienced in the empty set that disturbs all existing sets - is something 
in which we can nonetheless unconditionally trust, and that, therefore, it is 
something inherently good - also in the ethical sense of the word. Being qua 
being, being at the level of the 'real' as Lacan would call it, is trustworthy. 
This is something that Lacan never would say. For the real, should it break 
into our ordinary (symbolic) world, causes evil and disaster, and even destroys 
it. Human trust can never be embedded in the real; it has no ontological basis. 
At least, such is what Lacan, one of Badiou's main references, claims. Yet, 
this does not prevent Badiou from claiming exactly the opposite. Universal-
ity is true because it is 'real', because it accords with being qua Being, and 
therefore with something inherently good. One might sum up the fundamental 
non-articulated line of Badiou's thought in this way: ontology is not only a 
question of mathematics; at the most fundamental level, mathematical ontol-
ogy is a kind of belief in the truth and goodness of Being as such. It believes 
that truth and goodness can be realized, not only because they correspond to 
a formal criterion, but because, in the last resort, they correspond to being 
qua Being at the level of content. Because they are a response- or, perhaps 
more precisely, a gift- of being's generosity, a present proceeding from the 
inexhaustible source of possibility that being qua Being is. 
A revolution can only be true to the extent that it demolishes the established 
social distinctions, and reinstalls society on a more universal basis. This uni-
versality is true because it throws society back upon its ontological ground, 
i.e. its being qua Being. Thus- and here we fmd Badiou's presupposition 
- irrespective of its formal emptiness, being qua Being is true and good per 
se. The ontological ground of revolution, which is the 'event', presupposes 
the permanent good revolution that being qua Being is imagined to be: not 
formally, but as regards content. While formally, the 'event' disrupts society's 
settled organization, at the level of content, disruption itself is presumed to be 
inherently good. Being qua Being might be anarchic, impossible even to expe-
rience, but this impossible anarchy is surreptitiously considered an ontological 
'arche'. It may be a field of powers and forces that no one can ever master 
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and that is capable of being as cruel as death, but, in the long run, real being, 
being qua Being, is presumed not to be death but life. It is death's permanent 
resurrection. Being qua Being is revolution: positive, constructive revolution. 
This is ultimately why both revolution and fidelity to its event must be consid-
ered the real foundation of politics for Badiou. This is, I believe, the founding 
assumption that secretly sustains Badiou's thought. 
Here, perhaps, we discover why it is that Badiou never really concerns himself 
with revolution's dark sides. In his eyes, Robespierre's infamous 'Regime of 
Terror' (1793/94) did not discredit the reputation of the French Revolution, nor 
did the cruel Cultural Revolution of the sixties and seventies put China's Mao-
ist revolution in the wrong. Of course, one should best avoid such cruelties, 
Badiou also contends, but at the same time, he emphasizes how politics ought 
to not be built solely upon a will in order to avoid this. Politics is first and 
foremost a matter of truth, and thus of fidelity to an event (i.e. a revolution). 
A voiding terror is noble, but with respect to truth, it takes secondary place. 
Is it not for similar reasons that he fails to mention the well-known negative 
effects that Christian faith also produced during its history? At no place in 
Saint Paul does Badiou connect Paul's truth-claim with the terror the Church 
has been responsible for. Here, Badiou might argue that the reign of terror 
carried out by the Inquisition, for example, was caused not by the universality-
claim in which Christianity originates, but precisely in the denial of it. Christi-
anity was the cause qf terror only when it lost all feeling for its 'evental' - and 
thus universal - ground, and became concerned withexcluding non-Christians 
or (presumed) false Christians. To Badiou, Christianity's truth is, like every 
truth, neither exclusive nor inclusive of the other, but the creation of a univer-
sal ground upon which the difference between the one and the other no longer 
counts. This is what we must learn- and retain- from Christianity's origin as 
presented in the letters of Saint Paul. At least, this is what Badiou claims. 
However, looking more closely at the text of these letters, one can easily per-
ceive how, in contrast to Badiou's 'reading', Paul does articulate an inherent 
link between universality and exclusion. The passage in Paul's letter to the 
Romans where he argues his universality-claim can scarcely be read in any 
other way. As I will show, Paul's universality explicitly presupposes the exclu-
sion of what one might call with Derrida its 'originary supplement'. 
5. Universality's Mirrors (Reading Romans 11) 
If I confront Badiou here with the Paulinean text, it is not with the intention 
of enumerating all of the differences between the original text and Badiou' s 
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(mis)reading. One can, for instance, observe Badiou's silence over the well-
known passage in Romans 13 where Paul clearly states that Christians should 
accept and obey the ruling political power, because "the authorities that exist 
have been instituted by God" (Romans 13: 1). How can Badiou then argue that 
political revolution has something to learn from Paul? Of course, Paul does 
not say what Badiou says, and Badiou's reading is unquestionably coloured 
and contrived. But this is, in a sense, the very 'force' of his text. Badiou is 
not so much interpreting Paul as he is illustrating his own thesis by means of 
a forced reading of the Paulinean letters. If I here confront Badiou's interpre-
tation with the Paulinean text, it is not for the sake of a so-called objective 
criterion we might fmd in it. What concerns us is not Paul's text per se, but 
Badiou' s theory. The reading of Romans 11 I propose here is thus intended to 
shed some critical light on the kernel of Badiou' s theory. As I will show, there 
is a dialectical movement in Paul's reasoning to which Badiou cannot help but 
to remain blind. This dialectics connects universality with time and therefore 
infects Badiou' s theoretical claim regarding universality as a criterion for truth. 
But let us ftrst take a closer look at the 'dialectics of excJusion' at work in how 
Paul argues his universality-thesis in Letter to the Romans. 
The main theme of that letter is precisely the theme Badiou emphasizes in 
Paul: the non-difference between Jews and Greeks. The reason why Paul wrote 
to the Christian community in Rome is thought to have been a major conflict 
between both, i.e. between those who converted from Judaism (and possibly 
in the majority) and those who converted from other religions (and who, as an 
effect of Paul's interventions, soon became the majority). A sense of superior-
ity among the Jewish Christians must have forced Paul to write to them that 
this is without any ground, for in Christ all, Greeks and Jews, are equal. This 
is why, in his letter, Paul exhaustively expands upon Judaism and explains how 
the Jewish Law had failed and had been replaced by Christian Love. Think, 
for example, of the famous chapter 7 previously mentioned that describes the 
fatal 'dialectics between law and sin', and how - in chapter 8 - Christ has 
delivered us from this deadlock. 
Chapters 9 to 11 explicitly deal with the relation between the Jewish people 
(Israel) and the (other) 'nations' (the 'goiin', the Gentiles). This brings Paul 
to one of the most important questions confronting early Christian theology. 
If Israel and the 'goiin' -in Paul's vocabulary, Jews and Greeks- are non-
different in Christ, why should God, at the beginning, have made them dif-
ferent? In other words, why did God ftrst elect one nation to bring about its 
salvation, if he ultimately intended to bring salvation to all nations? Quoting 
a verse from Malachi, Paul refers to Israel's origin. When God elected Israel, 
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i.e. Jacob2°, the second son of Isaac, he disowned Jacob's brother Esau, Isaac's 
frrst-born son. "Just as it is written: «Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated»", Paul 
quotes (11: 13).21 
The God of all nations elected a single nation to whom he would give his 
privileged love. Why did He do so? Because of His Grace and Mercy, Paul 
answers, introducing a theme that will dominate Western thought for the next 
two millennia. "It does not depend on human desire or exertion, but on the 
mercy of God", he writes (9:16). In such Mercy, one can only believe. Faith 
alone gives access to it. However, in time, Israel neglected that faith and ulti-
mately lost it. At the critical moment, the elected nation stopped believing in 
God's mercy and refused to recognize Jesus as the Christ. And the question 
again is: 'why?' Surely, it must be Israel's own mistake, since it could have 
done otherwise, but, as Paul claims, it is simultaneously God himself who 
made Israel into an obstinate unbeliever. Here, in one of Christianity's earliest 
texts, we encounter the inherent ambiguity of later Christian thought regarding 
Judaism: its blindness is its own fault as well as a blindness caused by the 
Lord himself. 
Thus, at the beginning of chapter 11, Paul claims that God did not cast Israel 
away. Of course, once elected and honoured by the gift of the Law, Israel had 
now lost that honour, but it nonetheless remained elected, albeit in a different, 
fairly formal, negative way. Now it was elected not to see the truth; it was 
chosen (with eyes wide open) not to see that Jesus is Christ.22 It was chosen, 
if not to lose its election, then at least to be the "scandal" (mcavoaA.ov, skan-
dalon) among nations. In a paradoxical, ambiguous way, it was elected by the 
God of all nations to be the only un-elected nation in the world. 
However, a small part of the 'nation who elected to lose its election' is nonethe-
less elected to save that election (to put it in a way that emphasizes the strange 
paradox of Paul's logic). "[A]t the present time there is a remnant chosen by 
20 It is Jacob, Isaac's son, whose name, after having fought with him in a dark night, God changed 
to "Israel" (Genesis 32, 23-32). 
21 Not that, in the passage of Malachi, God proves his "love" for Israel/Jacob by explicitly 
referring to the exclusion of his brother Esau: "What follows is divine revelation. The word of the 
Lord came to Israel through Malachi: 'I have shown love to you,' says the Lord; but you say, 'How 
have you shown love to us?' 'Esau was Jacob's brother,' the Lord explains, 'yet I chose Jacob, and 
rejected Esau. I made Esau's mountains bare of population and gave his land to the jackals of the 
desert." (Malachi 1 : 1-3). 
22 Letter to the Romans 11:8-10: "as it is written, «God gave them a spirit of stupor, eyes that 
would not see and ears that would not hear, to this very day.» And David says, «Let their table 
become a snare and trap, a stumbling block [skandalon] and a retribution for them; let their eyes be 
darkened so that they may not see, and make their backs bend continually». 
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grace", Paul writes (11 :5). This "remnant"- a Christian one, because "chosen 
by Grace", i.e. the Jews who converted to Christianity- functions as a bridge 
that will bring the election to the 'nations'. This is what Jews such as Paul do: 
their conversion into Christianity opens salvation to all Gentiles. Here, we are 
entering the tricks of Christianity's 'economy of salvation'. For in a covert 
way, the conversion of the Gentiles will imply salvation for the Jews too. 
Let us ftrst focus on the Gentiles. It is through the Jews's fault that they have 
access to salvation. "[B]y their transgression salvation has come to the Gen-
tiles", Paul writes (11:11). Fortunately, the Jews transgressed the Law (nota 
bene precisely by trusting solely in the Law and not the Grace it comes from), 
so that Grace could be given to others, to the Gentiles. Through Israel's mis-
take, the world will be saved. More precisely, by becoming aware of Israel's 
blindness, the Gentiles will gain insight into the truth and the world will attain 
salvation. 
The whole world? Yes, because the Gentiles' election will cause the Jews to 
become jealous, and, once again in negative fashion, will maintain their long-
ing for salvation and for the election that, through their willing blindness of 
' the Messiah, they threw away. Here is the entire passage: 
But by their transgression salvation has come to the Gentiles, to make Israel 
jealous. Now if their transgression means riches for the world and their defeat 
means riches for the Gentiles, how much more will their full restoration bring? 
(11: 11-12). 
Israel's jealousy holds open the door to its salvation, and thus to the salvation 
not only of the Gentiles, but of the whole world, including Israel. 
This is what the Gentiles must keep in mind, Paul warns in what follows. 
They must not forget that Israel remains the origin of the salvation they actu-
ally enjoy. It is from this "tree" that God broke off the Jewish "branches" 
so that, in their place, He could graft the branches of the Gentiles. They must 
therefore always remember that God can do to them what he has done to the 
Jews. "For if God did not spare the natural branches, perhaps he will not spare 
you." (11 :21). Thus, there is no reason to consider themselves superior to the 
Jews. The Gentiles, too, disobeyed the Law even though they were ignorant of 
that Law, - but that is their own fault, as well. Finally, it is only through the 
Jewish Law that they have discovered salvation. Or those Jews, Paul writes, 
"if they do not continue in their unbelief - will be grafted in, for God is able 
to graft them in again" ( 11 : 23). 
Thus neither Jews nor Gentiles can claim to be superior to anyone else: in 
Christ, all have become equal. In a sense, they were already equal in their very 
difference. Addressing himself to the Gentiles, he writes: 
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Just as you were formerly disobedient to God, but have now received mercy 
due to their disobedience, so they too have now been disobedient in order 
that, by the mercy shown to you, they too may receive mercy. For God has 
consigned all to disobedience so that he may show mercy to all. Oh, the depth 
of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! (11 :30-33) 
By now, it should be clear that Badiou's 'reading' could only make an abstrac-
tion of this kind of dialectical 'economy of salvation'. To Badiou, the "wisdom 
and knowledge of God" is not the secret kernel of a dialectical logic but a 
'name' that translates fidelity to an event. Although it is clear now how far 
Badiou's 'reading' operates from Paul's literal text, it is therefore not unten-
able. For what Paul claims here is indeed a universal truth, i.e. a truth that 
enfeebles the truth-claims of both Jews and Gentiles, i.e. of the units constitut-
ing the existing world that Paul lives in. He correctly emphasizes how, to Paul 
too, truth is only possible as an entirely new and revolutionary universality 
based on the singular experience of an event. 
It is, however, questionable whether the dialectical logic through which Paul 
develops his universality-thesis can simply be neglected as Badiou does. 
Badiou neglects it because, for him, the universality that Paul claims has noth-
ing to do with dialectics (and its Aufhebung)23, but is founded in being qua 
Being or, which amounts to the same, in the event. What Paul, in a transcend-
ent way, describes as the "wisdom and knowledge of God", Badiou defmes in 
an immanent way: ~e event, the experience of being qua Being. 
Nevertheless, if we read the argument closely, we discover that universality is 
in fact dialectially realized. In Paul, universality is not so much the result of 
an event as is it the result of an enduring mutual relation between two oppo-
sites. Or, even more dialectically, it is the result of how a 'split', after many 
vicissitudes, fmally is overcome. The starting point is the split between one 
elected nation and the totality of others, i.e. between Israel and the Gentiles, 
whereas the main purpose of (inherently 'catholic') Christianity is to realize 
the same election on a universal ('catholic') level: in other words to realize 
Israel's election on the level of the Gentiles plus Israel. 
In fact, the realization of universal salvation is profoundly imaginary. According 
to the text's logic, it does not so much rest on reality or events as on images that 
each participant ascribes to the other. As we saw, it is a logic of jealousy. It is 
because the Jews believed too exclusively in their own Law (and forgot the Grace 
it came from) that they lost their election-status. This was then transferred to the 
23 See for example the chapter in Saint Paul: 'L'antidialectique de Ia mort et de Ia resurrection,' 
Badiou 1997a: 69-78. 
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Gentiles, precisely in order to make the Jews jealous, so that they would not forget 
to long for the salvation they had 'willingly' refused. Confronted with the 'other', 
Israel is expected to remain blind to the image it sees of its own salvation; it is 
only a persistent, secret jealousy that ultimately opens its eyes. On the other hand, 
the Gentiles must not blame the Jews for their 'jealousy', for they too ought rather 
to be jealous of the Jews, since Israel remains the origin of their salvation. They, 
too, must continue to hold Israel as the image of their salvation. 
The logic that Paul performs in Romans 11 represents universal salvation as 
the result of a mutual relation between Israel and the Gentiles, i.e. between 
those who once were elected among all nations, and the universe of nations 
newly inheriting that election. What is crucial here is that this relation is sup-
ported not so much by reality as by images. It is the image of the other that 
supports one's universality-claim. We can only encounter Israel's universality 
in the image of the Gentiles' salvation, as Paul argues. Similarly, the Gentiles 
must also recognize their salvation in the image of Israel's election. It is pre-
cisely this imaginary relationship that installs a permanent jealousy between 
both the Gentiles and Israel, each constructing their own identity in an imagi-
nary relation to the other- simultaneously admiring and jealous.24 
However, the tension between the Gentiles and Israel- between universality 
and election - is not described as a dialectical relation in the strictly Hege-
lian sense of the term: i.e. a relation of two opposites progressively growing 
towards each other. On the contrary, only the Gentiles progressively grow 
towards the other, whereas Israel - the part of Israel that rejects Christ -
remains outside that evolution. Here, Paul must explicitly rely on what he calls 
God's "mystery" (~ucr-rilptov, musterion). Warning the Gentiles that they 
ought not consider themselves superior to Israel, he writes: 
For I do not want you to be ignorant of this mystery, brothers and sisters, so that 
you may not be conceited: A partial hardening has happened to Israel until the full 
number of the Gentiles has come in. And so all Israel will be saved. (11 :25-26) 
Universality's realization is not a gradual evolution, but a process in which 
a single small original element obstinately resists. What is more, the whole 
process only operates thanks to that original resistant element. 
24 It is strange how Badiou, who, often refers explicitly to Lacan in his theory of the subject, does 
not pay much attention to the imaginary dimension of subject-constitution and of the subject itself. 
For Lacan, the imaginary is one of the indispensable elements of the subject; it is the foundation 
of the fantasy, which is the imaginary support of the symbolic subject as well as the subject's final 
protection against the real. The theory of the fantasy is one of the reasons for the emphasis on the 
imaginary in the late Lacan (see Julien 1996). 
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6. Truth & time 
What is the function of Israel's blindness in Gods 'economy of salvation'? 
Referring to certain recent philosophical schemas, one might say that, in 
Romans 9-11, Israel functions as an "originary supplement", (Derrida 1967; 
1976), or as "objet petit a" (Lacan 1978; 1979). The logical construction of 
identity (here: universal salvation) is always already deconstructed by some 
seemingly unimportant detail it originally excluded but upon which it secretly 
depends, as Derrida argues. Similarly, the imaginary/symbolic identity Lacan 
talks about is 'decentered' by an originally excluded object (objet petit a). 
In that sense, the construction of a universality-identity (for this is what a 
'truth-procedure' concerns) only functions by means of a 'radical' exclusion, 
i.e. an exclusion at the level of the 'radix' or origin. From this perspective, 
truth or universality is never really what it is. Truth will always need to con-
quer a little piece of 'untruth' or (so to speak) 'a-truth', in order to really 
become what it is - meaning that it will never be what is really is. Universal-
ity will always be forced to fight against a single strange left-over, a kind of 
'originary remainder' by which it is at the same time secretly sustained. 
Paul's text ultimately argues that kind of exclusion away, it is true: once time's 
circle is closed, Israel, too, will be saved and all Gentiles will become 'Israel'. 
But, contrary to Badiou, Paul does refer to the logic of original exclusion, and 
in a way admits that the only solution to the problem is a 'deus ex machina', 
his reference to God's 'mysterion'. Paul at least recognizes a kind of unman-
ageable split or difference at the very heart of the truth-procedure he is setting 
up - and even of the truth he is promoting. This problem is absent in Badiou. 
For Badiou, truth is One and Indivisible; it is not marked by any kind of dif-
ference. And neither is the truth-procedure. It operates in a world that is filled 
with differences, but is itself without difference. Universality's truth-procedure 
will never cease struggling against the differences, distinctions, fissures and 
'splittings' the world is comprised of, but is never described as split in itself 
or as characterized by an inner exclusion. Nowhere does Badiou define it as 
being dependent on- or deconstructed by- an 'originary remainder", unwit-
tingly produced by the universality-claim itself. 
25 
"D'oil. une loi, de portee considerable: le vrai n'a chance d'etre distinguable du veridique 
[Badiou's tenn for knowledge in the commun sense of the word] que s'il est infini. Une verite (si elle 
existe) est une partie infinie de Ia situation." (Badiou 1988: 368). "Whence a law, of considerable 
weight: the only way truth can be distinguished from knowledge is that it is infinite. A truth (should it 
exist) is an infinite part of the situation." On truth and immortality, see also Hallward, 2003: 156-159. 
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The fundamental problem behind all this is Badiou' s theory of time, more 
specifically, how he links time with being and truth. Like other twentieth-
century philosophers, he attempts to think the inner temporality of truth and 
being. This is the main question of Being and the Event - and, in a way, his 
entire oeuvre. Truth-claims are possible, he argues in this text, even if truth 
is no longer founded in eternal substances, in a Ding an sich (Thing in-itself). 
More precisely, truths, even 'eternal' truth, are only possible if they are not 
based in any kind of substantial and eternal Ding an sich. Only historicity 
and temporality can be truth's foundation - temporality, considered not as 
a continuum, but as a contingent series of discontinuities, of 'events'. Truth 
is inherently contingent. Its 'site' is the event, the eruption of an unforeseen 
and unforeseeable 'occurrence' or 'happening'. It emerges only when what 
is settled becomes 'unsettled', when particular distinctions that hold society 
together collapse; when being- i.e. the realm of existing differences -loses 
every supposed ground. This is when being is delivered to 'itself', i.e. to its 
'being qua Being' lacking all self,- the empty set, the void. If there is truth, 
it is based on being qua Being, i.e. upon the void, the unseen lack in the sup-
posed totality of being. Yet, truth is not some kind of "illumination" emerging 
suddenly from lack. Truth is a "procedure", a process. Besides its foundation 
in pure temporality (contingency), it is by definition a temporal procedure as 
well: a procedure both using time and limited in time. If Badiou speaks of it 
in terms of "eternal truth", then, eternity is not the opposite of temporality but 
of actuality.25 Truth is only eternal in so far as it is radically different from the 
actual differences and distinctions the world is made of. 
Yet, how precisely is time involved in a truth-procedure? Doubtless in the way 
that it takes time, once there has been a fidelity to an event, to build up the 
subject of that fidelity as well as its object (truth). But is not time essentially 
employed here to keep time out? Is it not used to deny the inherent temporal-
ity of 'eternal truth'? Can we not say the procedure is temporary only inso-
far as it takes all the time to deny that the eternal truth it is fighting for, is 
affected by time? Remember, Paul explicitly links difference with time. It is 
precisely because the truth - universal salvation - was marked by difference 
(by a holy/unholy remainder, by Israel as origin/remainder) that it took time to 
be realized. It took literally all the time. In his eyes, the actualized universal 
salvation coincides with a destruction of time itself. To Paul, the destruction 
of differences equals the destruction of time. Is this not the case in Badiou 
as well? Truth is beyond existing differences and, in that sense, 'eternal'. 
However, isn't truth's eternity and infinity most especially the result of a truth-
procedure's continuous exclusion of time? This is what certain passages in 
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Badiou literally say. For example, in his book on Deleuze, we read: "It is in 
the abolition of time that truth's eternity emerges" (Badiou, 1997b: 97). Are 
truth and truth-procedure ever possible then, without either taking all the time 
to exclude time, or, in a purely formal way, to exclude it imaginarily, i.e. to act 
as if time does not - or does not yet - affect the truth we are fighting for? 
But how could truth not be affected - and thus weakened, destabilized and 
undermined - by time? If being is temporal, if being is at times turned over by 
revolutionary events, why should truths escape that rule? They do not, Badiou 
would reply. Truths, too, are susceptible to revolutions. However, they cannot 
take this into account, precisely because they are based upon revolutions. A 
revolution is the effect of history's contingency but, once started, it can no 
longer take into account its own contingency. This would shatter its militancy 
in advance. It can only unconditionally promote the truth to which it is faithful. 
No truth procedure can pretend to install once and for all the ever-lasting true 
society, but they nevertheless speak in the name of a truth that is different from 
all the differences society is made of, a truth that is the one and indivisible 
truth of those differences. It is in this sense that truth can be eternal. 
Here, in this difficult and paradoxical knot of Badiou's thought, one can see 
the hidden, unarticulated assumption slumbering in his formal ontology once 
more. Although this ontology is said to be strictly formal (mathematical), it is 
secretly supported by a presupposition at the level of content, i.e. a belief in 
being's fundamental goodness and generosity. Truth's universality-criterion is 
based in the non-differential, universal character of being qua Being, and the 
fact that we can trust that ontological side of being supposes that it is in itself 
trustworthy; that being qua Being is 'good' and 'generous'. 
Badiou 's theory of eternal truth presupposes the same belief. For if truth is 
based in a revolutionary event, it is founded not in being (i.e. the totality of 
particular sets) but in being qua Being. And if truth is marked by time, it is by 
the kind of time that, on one level of being, intervenes destructively, but at the 
level of being qua Being, is positive and constitutive. It is precisely ontologi-
cal time - the time of being qua Being - that makes truth 'eternal' .26 Every 
genuine truth-claim is anchored in this ontological foundation and in the type 
of time that reigns there as well. That is why a truth-claim and its procedure 
are immune to the temporary differences that being is made of. Truths and 
26 Infinity characterizes being solely in its ontological dimension and is, therefore, the result of an 
"ontological decision". Badiou 1988: 167: "D'oii cet enonce crucial: la these de !'infinite de l'etre est 
necessairement une decision ontologique, c'est-a-dire un axiome." "Whence this crucial statement: the 
thesis of the infinity of being is necessarily an ontological decision, that's to say, an axiom." 
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truth-procedures are embedded in a time in which destruction and death do not 
represent finitude, limitation, decline, beginning and ending27, the hallmarks 
of being at the level of life and society as they normally function. At the 
ontological level, however, there is neither beginning nor end, because, there, 
death equals resurrection, and destruction is only another word for the libera-
tion of being's truth. At that level, there is only the presence of 'presentation', 
a presence radically different from the temporary differences characterizing 
the level of 'representation'. In this ontological and 'eternal' presence, death 
is always already resurrection. Except, you cannot put it the other way round: 
resurrection is not always already death. Death, life and death, temporality, 
finitude etc. belong exclusively to the worldly time of being. Being qua Being 
has only life. There, even death is life, in the way immediately it turns into 
resurrection. And this is why we can trust that ontological level and make it 
the base of our truth. At least, such is the hidden assumption slumbering in 
Badiou' s ontological theory of truth. He himself emphasizes how ontology and 
truth are to be purely formally defmed. 
This is what he emphasizes in Saint Paul as well. Paul:s formal 'Catholicism' 
is the ontological condition of truth as such. But this is not the ontological 
condition defended by traditional Christianity, Badiou stresses. For God is 
dead, and if truth is based in being as such, one can only claim this on purely 
formal, mathematical grounds. But the question I raised here is whether the 
dead God does not secretly return in Badiou's supposedly atheist, formal ontol-
ogy. Doesn't the Christian God, being's Creator and therefore truth's ultimate 
base, secretly resurrect himself in Badiou' s ontology? Isn't God, including his 
resurrection, simply ontologized? Is he not still responsible, despite his death, 
for being's permanent resurrection? Does He not survive in the assumption 
that being's permanent resurrection- or, which amounts to the same thing, 
permanent revolution- is inherently good and generous? Is he not still the 
ultimate guarantee, enabling us to speak in the name of being qua Being so that 
we can remain settled in an eternal truth beyond being's contingency? 
7. Modern Question 
Alain Badiou's analysis of post-modernity's false pretentions, his passionate 
plea for truth and militant enthusiasm, his revalorization of universality: all 
this gives his thought the refreshing tone that makes him so well appreciated 
n Cf. the passage in L'2tre et l'evenement where he asserts that, at the ontological level, "being 
does not begin" (Badiou 1988: 233: "L'8tre ne commence pas."). 
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today. The massive interest for his work sufficiently illustrates this. Yet, the 
basic line of his thought, i.e. a faith in the inherent goodness of being, remains 
painfully unquestioned. It seems to be basically this faith which allows him, 
heir of the 'masters of suspicion', to rediscover the fidelity to truth. However, 
it remains questionable if, relying on a mathematically packed faith in being, 
Badiou does not avoid the most crucial question modem thought faces, i.e. the 
question whether modem thought can or cannot maintain ontological preten-
tions. 
A frrst shape of modem thought is to be typified by the common feature of 
anti-essentialism. It is a way of thinking that sticks strictly to the 'surface' of 
what it is engaged in. Newtonian physics tellingly illustrates this. This kind of 
physics does not ask for the essence of the apple falling from a tree, it limits 
itself only to a formalisation of the apple's falling 'ceremony', and only to this. 
This is the new 'truth procedure' Newton introduced in science, a procedure 
which, a century later, Kant has given solid philosophical grounds. What is 
sacrificed here is nothing less than real being- das Ding an sich. From now, 
this is definitely beyond the reach of science. In this modem shape, knowledge 
has lost its ontological foundation. 
This is, however, not the only shape of modem thought. There is an other line 
in western thought which never has recognized the ontological break and did 
continue to think in a metaphysical way (metaphysical in the Kantian sense of 
the word). Authors like Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze have kept on fol-
lowing the tracks of Spinoza and Leibniz, for whom thinking gets a grip on 
'essences' and is itself 'essential'. Yet, they considered the 'essence' in a radi-
cal different way: not as a fixed, unchangeable substance, but as never resting 
energetic field, an anarchistic 'elan vital', a 'rhizomatic' network changing 
every apparently fixed 'thing' into a volatile snapshot within a hypercreative 
universe. 
At frrst sight, Badiou's formal and mathematical philosophy seems to belong 
to the other side, the side that found its definite formulation in Kant's critical 
epistemology. Knowledge and thought have no direct access to being as such. 
This is also the starting point of Alain Badiou. One can only deal with being 
indirectly, i.e. formally, mathematically. Yet, the basic supposition underlying 
his theory locates him on the other side. Faithfulness to the event and its truth 
relies on a kind of basic trust in being as such. Being itself is revolution, a 
revolution which, contrary to what it seems, is full of good intentions and turns 
everything in the (morally) right direction. 
In this respect, Badiou's philosophy operates right upon the separating line 
between the two paradigms of modem thought. Badiou's 'ontology' does not 
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pretend to express being as such, but it functions within an exclusively ''rep-
resentational' universe. Truth is a matter of mathematically shaped universal-
ity, i.e. of 'catholicity' in the merely formal sense of the word- a sens which, 
instead of excluding, affirms its contingence. This is at least the exoteric side 
of his discourse. There is, however, an esoteric side, for his affirmation of 
radical contingency is only possible because of a less formal 'catholic' faith. 
His faith in the revolutionary truth is only possible because of his supposition 
that being is itself revolution, and more precisely a basically good revolution. 
Being qua being, which cannot be represented and, therefore, always emerges 
as a merely revolutionary presence, is nonetheless a generous kind of being, 
which turns the revolution's violence into the power of goodness. In that 
perspective, Badiou's 'catholicism' comes peculiarly close to the doctrinal 
catholicism it rejects. 
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